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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the credit constraints, using the cash flow sensitivity approach, of private and listed companies between 2007 and 
2010. According to this approach, the econometric results show that the credit constraints are the same for either private or listed com-
panies. This paper seeks to contribute to the literature because the study of credit constraints of private companies based on cash flow 
sensitivity in Brazil has been rare.
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 1 INTRODUCTION
ter correlation between cash flow and investment. Given 
this hypothesis, the main objective of this study is to use 
the cash flow sensitivity approach to determine whether 
private companies indeed have higher credit constraints, 
compared to listed companies. Although there have been 
other studies of the cash flow sensitivity of Brazilian com-
panies, including those by Terra (2003) and Aldrighi and 
Bisinha (2010), the application of this approach for priva-
te companies is unprecedented in Brazil.
A comparison of investment-cash flow sensitivity be-
tween private and listed companies was conducted throu-
gh econometric analysis in a dynamic panel, using a sam-
ple obtained from the Institute for Accounting, Actuarial 
and Financial Research Foundation (Fundação Instituto 
de Pesquisas Contábeis, Atuariais e Financeiras - Fipe-
cafi), consisting of 164 listed companies and 688 private 
companies in the period from 2007 to 2010. 
The results showed no difference in credit constraints 
for listed or private companies because the difference in 
investment-cash flow sensitivity was not statistically sig-
nificant between them, according to the cash flow sensi-
tivity approach. 
At first, an interaction term was used to differentiate 
listed companies from private ones. To analyze robust-
ness, estimates were also obtained using separate regres-
sions (only private companies) and other methods: OLS 
(ordinary least squares) or OLS with lagged dependent 
variables, in addition to first-difference GMM (generali-
zed method of moments; Wooldridge, 2002). In all of the 
cases, the results were very similar.
In addition to this introduction, the present study is 
organized as follows: section 2 presents a literature re-
view on the topic, and section 3 presents the econome-
tric methodology. Section 4 describes the sample data, 
whereas the econometric results are shown and analyzed 
in section 5, and finally, in section 6, the final conclu-
sions are presented. 
According to Fazzari, Glenn and Petersen (1988), in-
formation asymmetry causes capital constraints by rai-
sing the costs of external financing1 (debt or issuance of 
shares), because shareholders and creditors will charge 
premiums for taking the risk of financing struggling com-
panies, masked by the lack of information transparency 
between managers and investors. The less transparent the 
information of a company is, the more difficult (high inte-
rest rates or legal restrictions) it will be to obtain credit or 
to issue shares to finance its operating activities. In turn, 
the greater the information asymmetry is, the more the 
company will use internal funds to finance its investments 
because these companies have higher constraints regar-
ding external sources of capital. 
To measure the degree of corporate capital constraints, 
Fazzari et al. (1988) proposed an econometric model in 
which investment was a function of Tobin’s Q (a variable 
that captures future investment opportunities) and opera-
ting cash flow. According to this approach, if the company 
did not have capital constraints, investment would not be 
significantly correlated with cash flow because the com-
pany would use credit or the issuance of shares to finance 
itself, and all cash surplus would be distributed in the form 
of dividends. Conversely, if the company had external fi-
nancing constraints generated by information asymmetry 
between managers and investors, the cash flow would have 
a significant and positive correlation with investment. This 
approach to measuring the degree of capital constraints of 
companies is known as cash flow sensitivity (investment 
sensitivity to cash flow fluctuations). In summary, the hi-
gher the information asymmetry of a company is, the grea-
ter the external financing constraints are, reflected in incre-
ased investment-cash flow sensitivity.
In principle, private companies, due to having more 
information asymmetry in light of the lower require-
ments regarding information transparency to the market, 
should have greater credit constraints caused by a grea-
 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The measurement of capital constraints by the econo-
metric cash flow sensitivity approach, controlled by other 
variables (usually Tobin’s Q), is a very current topic and 
has been widely discussed in corporate finance. 
This line of research began with an article by Fazzari et al. 
(1988). In this study, the authors partitioned the sample ac-
cording to the distributions of dividends, based on the follo-
wing premise: companies that pay fewer dividends are con-
sidered more constrained because they would have to retain 
cash to fund their investments. In addition to confirming 
this hypothesis, the article encouraged the application of the 
cash flow sensitivity approach in several subsequent studies 
that attempted to capture the capital constraints for different 
companies from the perspective of different variables (size, 
credit rating, financial market proximity, asset tangibility).
Hoshi (1991), for example, found that companies with 
close relationships to bankers (belonging to a keiretsu – a 
Japanese industrial group) have fewer capital constraints. 
Furthermore, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) showed 
that companies that undergo credit rating evaluations 
(commercial paper issuers) have lower credit constraints, 
while Carpenter and Petersen (2002) showed that new 
firms linked to the technology sector had more external 
financing constraints. 
1  In the literature on this topic, the terms capital constraint, credit constraint or external financing constraint are used to designate credit constraints or the issuance of shares.
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Moreover, Almeida and Campelo (2007) showed the 
importance of collateral (tangibility) in reducing cre-
dit constraints. In the following year, Ratti, Lee and Seol 
(2008) showed that banking concentrations reduced the 
credit constraints of companies.
In Brazil, Aldrighi and Bisinha (2010) showed that 
large companies had higher investment-cash flow sensi-
tivity, contradicting the results of Terra (2003), who sho-
wed that large companies and multinationals had lower 
credit constraints. However, the author showed that, with 
the exception of these two groups, Brazilian companies 
exhibited, on average, capital constraints from 1986 to 
1997. To reach this conclusion, Terra adopted two diffe-
rent approaches: the classical approach, in which Tobin’s 
Q appears as a control variable in the cash flow sensiti-
vity model; and another approach, in which current and 
lagged income replaces Tobin’s Q to capture investment 
opportunities. Both models reached the same results.
Brown and Petersen (2009) drew attention to the in-
crease in cash flow sensitivity coefficients over the years. 
To the authors, this decline indicated lower capital cons-
traints due to the development of the stock market in the 
United States (creation of Nasdaq - National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations, in the 
1970s) and a greater weight of investments in intangible 
assets not captured in previous studies.
However, there have been studies criticizing this ap-
proach. Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999) and 
Kadapakkam, Kumar and Riddick (1998) questioned the 
cash flow sensitivity methodology. In broad terms, the 
studies showed that companies with better financial he-
alth (more cash availability, lower levels of debt) are those 
with the highest investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
In Moyen’s view (2004), differences in the interpre-
tation of the investment-cash flow sensitivity coefficient 
result from the type of sample partitioning. If this rela-
tionship is tested for samples rated according to infor-
mation asymmetry criteria (size, retention of dividends, 
capital control, among others), cash flow sensitivity will 
capture capital constraints, as initially proposed by Fazza-
ri et al. (1988). However, if companies are grouped accor-
ding to factors related to the availability of internal funds, 
the investment-cash flow sensitivity coefficient will have 
the opposite relationship, i.e., the better that the financial 
health of a company is, the greater the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity is.
Cleary (2007) confirmed the interpretation of Moyen 
(2004), using a theoretical model (U curve) that was empi-
rically tested. In his study, the results showed that support 
the works by Fazzari et al. (1988) and by Kaplan and Zin-
gales (1997). Guaraglia (2008) also confirmed the U cur-
ve. To reach this conclusion, the author analyzed private 
companies in the UK. If companies are rated according 
to information asymmetry criteria, the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity increases with increasing constraints. Ho-
wever, if companies are rated according to the availability 
of internal funds or with financial indices, the greater the 
capital constraints are, the lower the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity is. 
The notion behind the U curve is that companies in 
bad financial conditions would use more credit to invest 
and ensure their survival (negative relationship) when fa-
cing cash flow reductions. Conversely, companies in good 
financial condition, as their cash flow increased, would 
use more internal funds to invest not to suffer a capital 
cost increase (cost effect). According to the author, the 
central point for the divergence of results is to understand 
whether, in fact, credit constraints are conditioned by in-
formation asymmetry or by issues related to the financial 
performances of companies. 
Another issue raised in the literature (Alti, 2003) is 
that the use of Tobin’s average Q in the regression as a 
non-observable proxy of Tobin’s marginal Q can generate 
biased results in the interpretation of cash flow sensitivity. 
Despite the differences in the interpretation of cash 
flow sensitivity, the investment-cash flow sensitivity con-
tinues to be investigated fairly and to be used as a credit 
constraint measurement. 
 3 ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY
Because the present study investigates the investment-
-cash flow sensitivity – including for private companies 
– the use of Tobin’s Q as a control variable will not be 
possible, because the market value of private companies is 
not available. In this case, the sales accelerator model used 
by Terra (2003) is adopted:
The sales accelerator model assumes that the invest-
ment made in a given year is a function of current inco-
me and income from the previous year. Income increa-
ses would signal greater investment opportunities due to 
the need for company growth. Thus, the income variable 
would replace Tobin’s Q as an indicator variable of invest-
ment opportunities. 
In the absence of capital constraints, which assume the-
re is no difference in costs between internal financing and 
external financing to the company, the investment should 
be financed only with debt equity or the issuance of sha-
res, and all of the cash flow generated should be distribu-
ted in the form of dividends. Thus, if cash flow is related 
to investment, it is an indication of capital constraints, to 
α β β β β( ) ( )+ +
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the extent that the company uses internal funds to finance 
itself (Fazzari et al., 1998). Thus, the cash flow variable (
) is included in the sales accelerator model described 
above to capture capital constraint. As in Aldrighi and Bisi-
nha (2010), the EBITDA variable is used as a proxy for cash 
flow (CFit), which is obtained from the sum of operating 
income plus depreciation. Variable  is the investment in 
fixed assets (Capex - capital expenditure) held by a parti-
cular company during year t. The investment is calculated 
by the difference between the fixed assets from one year to 
another. Variables  and  represent the company’s 
income in year t and the previous year t-1, respectively. The 
Dit.CFit variable represents the interaction term to captu-
re the difference in the cash flow coefficient between listed 
and private companies (private D=0, and listed company 
D=1). All of the variables were divided by fixed assets from 
the previous year ( ) to avoid size distortions.
The model hypothesis is the same as that discussed in 
the previous sections. If the  coefficient of the cash flow 
has a significant relationship with investment, that is an 
indication of capital constraint; otherwise, there is no cre-
dit constraint. In turn, the interaction dummy measures 
the existence of differences in credit constraints between 
private and listed companies. It is worth remembering 
that the cash flow coefficient of listed companies is the 
linear combination (sum) of the cash flow coefficient and 
interaction dummy.
The analysis is performed by the first-difference GMM 
technique proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Widely 
used in this literature, the use of the lagged dependent 
variable (dynamic panel) is justified by the correlation 
between current investment and past investment. It is re-
asonable to assume that unobservable, idiosyncratic fixed 
factors of the company affect investment decisions and 
are related to the explanatory variables (income and cash 
flow). In this case, the fixed effect is removed by the first 
difference. However, the presence of the lagged variable 
using the first difference generates endogeneity that is 
corrected with instrumental variables that are the higher 
lags of the explanatory variables in the model. The use of 
these instruments must be validated by the Sargan test 
(Wooldridge, 2002), and the errors should not be auto-
-correlated. The statistics of these tests are presented in 
section 5 (Result Analysis). 
It is worth noting that these instruments only solve the 
problem generated by the actual removal of fixed effects 
from the dynamic panel. It is reasonable to question that the-
re might be a simultaneity bias between cash flow and invest-
ment. This type of endogeneity, in this line of research, has 
been little explored in the literature. In fact, the investment 
made in one year can generate cash flow in the same year. 
However, this effect is small in almost all cases because the 
investment is relatively small relative to existing assets, and 
such investment generates cash flow for a limited number 
of months during the year. Therefore, it is expected that the 
incremental cash flow generated by investment during the 
year is small, compared to the existing cash flow.
Although the focus of interest is the first-difference 
GMM, the results are reported by POLS and dynamic 
POLS (with the lagged dependent variable), although in 
these cases, stronger assumptions are required regarding 
the relationship between the error and the explanatory 
variables. The presentation of results using other techni-
ques requires more robustness of the study in that it asses-
ses the stability of results when using different techniques.
Finally, questions could be raised regarding the issues 
of multicollinearity and autocorrelation between the va-
riables. Regarding the issue of (imperfect) multicollinea-
rity between income and cash flow, it is noted that such 
problems do not lead to estimation bias, leading only to an 
increase in the standard error of the estimator. In contrast, 
autocorrelation could be a problem in the case of large pa-
nels. However, in small panels, as in the case of the present 
study, this issue becomes negligible (Wooldridge, 2002).
2 The Fipecafi sample is used for the publication of the “Largest and Best” by Exame Magazine. We thank Fipecafi for the data provided for the study.
 4 DATA DESCRIPTION
Data for the study were provided by Fipecafi2. The 
sample consists of annual balance sheet data (2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010) of the top 1,000 companies (private and lis-
ted companies) rated by Fipecafi according to net income. 
The “Top 1,000” correspond to the 1,000 highest net inco-
me values for each year. Because the data from 1,000 com-
panies were provided for the four years mentioned, the 
initial sample included 4,000 observations. However, not 
all of the companies were included in the sample for each 
year. There have been companies that have reached a cer-
tain level of income in one year but not in a different year. 
In addition, some companies have not reported the data 
required for the study. Thus, the final sample consisted of 
852 companies and 2,651 observations in an unbalanced 
panel. Of these companies, 81% are private, and 19% are 
listed (Table 1).
Table 2 shows the sample composition by sector. It is 
worth remembering that this type of study excludes finan-
cial companies because there would not be a clear divi-
sion among financing, investment and operating results. 
According to table 2, the stock market in Brazil is well 
diversified, with emphases on the energy and services sec-
tors. Of this total, 67% of the sample companies are Brazi-
lian and private, 8% are Brazilian state-owned companies, 
and the remainder are foreign multinationals.
Capital Control nº %
Listed companies 164 19%
Private companies 688 81%
Total 852 100%
Source: Fipecafi
Table 1   Capital Control
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Table 3 shows the mean and median values of the 
study variables. The discrepancy between the mean and 
the median in the sample is explained by the existence of 
observations with high values  in the sample. The results 
show that investment has remained almost stable over 
the years, with slight increases in 2007 and 2010. In those 
same years, cash flow and income had the highest means 
and medians, compared to other periods. It is worth no-
ting that the economy exhibited growth of 6.09% in 2007 
and 7.53% in 2010 (Banco Central, 2012). 
 5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Table 4 presents the results using the interaction dummy 
to capture the differences in the cash flow coefficient of private 
and listed companies. It is interesting to note that despite the 
different methods used, the results point in the same direc-
tion, indicating no difference in the investment-cash flow sen-




Capital Goods 21 2%






Construction Industry 52 6%
Computer Industry 20 2%
Mining 20 2%
Paper and Pulp 21 2%
Agriculture 39 5%









Table 2   Sector Composition
Source: Prepared by the author with Fipecafi data
Variables 2007 2008 2009 2010
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Income/Kt-1 44.39 4.91 34.28 4.76 22.74 4.30 59.72 5.50
Cash Flow/Kt-1 1.44 0.45 1.97 0.49 1.39 0.37 7.80 0.46
Investment/Kt-1 4.59 0.04 3.56 0.04 3.77 0.04 4.71 0.07
Table 3   Mean and Median Variables
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lated by the “annualization” of the average daily trading 
volume per company in the stock exchange divided by 
its market value. The results indicate that the turnover is 
much lower in Brazil than in the US. While the median 
Brazilian turnover is 21%, the 1st quartile is 4%, and the 
3rd quartile is 55%, in the US, the median turnover is 82%, 
the 1st quartile is 4%, and the 3rd quartile is 178%. It could 
also be argued that the similar behavior between listed 
and private companies in Brazil is related to the perfor-
mance of private equity funds that increase the liquidity 
of private companies. Nevertheless, the results are consis-
tent with the study of Chen and Chen (2012), showing the 
disappearance of the investment-cash flow sensitivity in 
companies located in the US during the financial crisis in 
that country but without identifying a specific cause for 
the phenomenon. From the perspective of Brown and Pe-
tersen (2009), the disappearance of the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity is linked to investments in intangible as-
sets not captured in balance sheets and to the develop-
ment of the capital market. Both arguments could be valid 
in the Brazilian context. The investment data used in this 
study refer only to investments in fixed assets. Thus, there 
could be a dependency of the cash flow on investments in 
intangible assets not captured by a limitation of the study 
data. In turn, the development of the capital market might 
have led Brazilian companies to become less dependent 
on their internal cash flow to finance their expansion. 
Such a line of thinking is confirmed by the growing num-
ber of initial public offerings (IPOs) during the period. In 
2007, 64 companies made public offerings of its shares. 
Another factor that might have reduced the capital cons-
traints was the credit incentive promoted by the Brazilian 
government (release of funds and reduction of the interest 
rate) during the US banking crisis, aiming to avoid the stag-
The results show that lagged investment during a pe-
riod is correlated with the investment during the follo-
wing year. Such a result is also intuitive because compa-
nies that invested more in the past tend to invest more in 
the subsequent year to maintain the same level of opera-
ting activities. It is noteworthy that the instrumentaliza-
tion through the use of the lagged dependent variable in 
the dynamic panel was validated by the Sargan test and 
the error autocorrelation test, at a 5% significance level.
 In turn, the interaction dummy was significant only 
for 10% of the model by OLS without the lagged depen-
dent variable. However, it is worth noting that the cash 
flow coefficient for listed companies is measured by the 
sum of the interaction dummy with the cash flow of the 
regression and not by the isolated value of the interac-
tion dummy. In the three models, the cash flow coefficient 
of listed companies is not significant for the linear form 
(sum of cash flow with the interaction dummy).
In other words, the three methods indicate that there 
were no differences in credit constraints for listed compa-
nies, compared to private companies. This result does not 
confirm the hypothesis that listed companies should have 
lower capital constraints as a result of having less informa-
tion asymmetry. A possible explanation for this finding is 
that private companies within the top 1,000 companies 
can have a high level of disclosure (information transpa-
rency) due to being very large companies with high ma-
rket visibility that might consider IPOs in the near future. 
Another possible explanation for the phenomenon is 
that Brazilian companies have low turnover, behaving in 
practice as private companies. To support this hypothesis, 
the turnover of Brazilian companies was calculated with 
data from the Capital IQ database and was compared with 
the turnover of US companies. The turnover was calcu-
Dependent Variable: Investment
Independent Variables First-difference GMM OLS Dynamic OLS 
    
(I/K) i,t-1 1.699*** 0.359***
(0.129) (0.121)
(CF/K) i,t -0.00208 -0.0440 -0.0463
(0.0673) (0.0465) (0.0301)
(Inc/K)i,t 0.0247*** 0.0129** 0.0155***
(0.00947) (0.00633) (0.00440)
(Inc/K) i,t-1 -0.0142 0.00763 -0.00321
(0.0107) (0.00500) (0.00277)




No. of Observations 624 1.639 1.075
R squared 0.080 0.468
No. of Companies 357   
J test (p value) 0.4919
Autocorrelation Test (p value) 0.0910
Note: Source - Fipecafi. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust errors in brackets. Instruments validated by Sargan test (H0: instruments are valid). Lack of 
autocorrelation between errors in first difference (H0: lack of first-order autocorrelation). K: fixed assets in t-1. I: Investment. Inc: Income. DCF: Interaction 
dummy to capture differences between the coefficient of listed and private companies.
Table 4   Regression Results for the Whole Sample with Interaction Dummy
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nation of Brazilian companies. It is worth mentioning that, 
in addition to the increase in the credit volume, the basic in-
terest rate of the economy continued on a downward trend.
To give more robustness to the results, regressions were 
obtained separately for the private and listed companies. 
The results were similar to the model with the use of the in-
teraction dummy, evidencing no credit constraint in both 
cases (Tables 5 and 6).
Dependent Variable: Investment
Independent Variables First-difference GMM OLS Dynamic OLS 
    
(I/K) i,t-1 -0.449*** 1.003***
(0.0419) (0.108)
(CF/K) i,t -0.0708 -1.371 0.00383
(0.231) (1.324) (0.557)
(Inc/K)i,t 0.0292 0.450 0.189
(0.0759) (0.359) (0.162)




No. of Observations 160 378 256
R squared 0.311 0.901
No. of Companies 90
J test (p value) 0.3743
Autocorrelation Test (p value) 0.9876   
Note: Source - Fipecafi. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust errors in brackets. Instruments validated by Sargan test (H0: instruments are valid). Lack of 
autocorrelation between errors in first difference (H0: lack of first-order autocorrelation). K: fixed assets in t-1. I: Investment. Inc: Income.
Table 5   Regression Results for the Sample with Only Listed Companies 
Dependent Variable: Investment
Independent Variables First-difference GMM OLS Dynamic OLS 
    
(I/K) i,t-1 1.619** 0.259***
(0.656) (0.0792)
(CF/K) i,t 0.0178 0.0113 0.000421
(0.0646) (0.0352) (0.0327)
(Inc/K)i,t 0.0197** 0.0149*** 0.0189***
(0.00831) (0.00454) (0.00492)




No. of Observations 464 1.261 822
R squared 0.089 0.467
No. of companies 270
J test (p value) 0.1541
Autocorrelation Test (p value) 0.0658   
Note: Source - Fipecafi. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust errors in brackets. Instruments validated by Sargan test (H0: instruments are valid). Lack of 
autocorrelation between errors in first difference (H0 lack of first-order autocorrelation). K: fixed assets in t-1. I: Investment. Inc: Income.
Table 6   Regression Results for the Sample with Only Private Companies
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 6 CONCLUSION
ther interesting result was the disappearance of the invest-
ment-cash flow sensitivity during the analyzed period. A 
similar result was found by Chen and Chen (2012), but for 
companies in the US during the banking crisis there. This 
evidence suggests a common dynamic of investment-cash 
flow sensitivity for both countries during the crisis. Based 
on Brown and Petersen (2009), the development of the ca-
pital market and the increase in investments in intangible 
assets could have explained the non-dependence on cash 
flow for investments in fixed assets during the analyzed 
period. Another possible explanation might be related to 
credit incentives from the government that could have re-
duced the dependence on cash flow for investments from 
2007 to 2010.
This study analyzed the credit constraints of Brazilian 
companies from 2007 to 2010 by the cash flow sensitivity 
approach. The results showed that there is no difference 
in the investment-cash flow sensitivity between listed and 
private companies. According to the cash flow sensitivi-
ty approach, there is no difference in credit constraints 
between listed and private companies. This evidence su-
ggests that the degree of information asymmetry of listed 
and private companies might be the same in Brazil for 
the analyzed sample. Additionally, the results might have 
been influenced by the low turnover of Brazilian listed 
companies, by the performance of private equity funds in 
private companies, and by the high rate of the disclosure 
of information transparency of private companies. Ano-
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